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I. INTRODUCTION
I want to start by offering my great thanks to the members of the St. Louis
University Law Journal for this wonderful gathering; it is such a pleasure to be
part of the Childress program this year. And on behalf of all of us, I want to
share thanks as well with Heather Gerken, for giving us these wonderful ideas
to collectively chew on. While some of the particulars are chewier for me than
others, I strongly support the central thrust of her proposal—that federalism
theory has come to the point at which it no longer makes sense, if it ever did, to
characterize the grand theoretical debate as one between “federalism” and
“nationalism.”1
Heather’s work represents a critical component of an emerging consensus
among contemporary federalism theorists that the old frameworks for thinking
about interjurisdictional governance are broken.2 Among her many outstanding
contributions to the field is scholarship that draws together the energy of so
many sub-disciplinarians from within the greater federalism discourse. In her
work, she brings together perspectives from election law, administrative law,
health law, immigration law, environmental law, and others—including those
from many of us here today.3 Often following independent paths, many of us
have arrived in similar theoretical territory, including our recognition that the
federal system depends as much on interjurisdictional integration as it does on
jurisdictional separation (and in some respects, more so).4 Heather is right: it is
time for those on both sides of the state-federal turf war to consider détente.
For me, the important question is what the terms of that détente should look
like, and that is what I’d like to talk about today.
Heather credits environmental federalism scholars, in particular, as early
movers in this direction.5 So in my remarks today, I want to start with a few
comments about the significance of environmental law’s position at the
vanguard of this more dynamic understanding of federalism. I’ll note the
increasing importance of “applied federalism” in the literature, and the special
features of environmental governance that make it a wellspring of federalism
controversy. Then I’ll share some important points in support of Heather’s call

1. Heather Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
997, 997–99 (2015).
2. See ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN xxvi−xxvii & nn.71–72
and accompanying text (Oxford, 2014) (contrasting the canonical federalism literature and the
challenge from dynamic federalism scholars).
3. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1002–07.
4. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J.
1889, 1890 (2014); See Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution:
Navigating the Separation of Powers both Vertically and Horizontally, COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
(Mar. 2015) [hereinafter Ryan, Navigating the Separation of Powers] (reviewing the emerging
literature on negotiated structural governance).
5. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1004.
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for détente, emphasizing the centrality of state-federal integration in American
federalism and the defining importance of federalism’s ends in relation to its
means. I’ll close with a few points of constructive disagreement, addressing the
relationship between federalism process and principle, the meaning of
federalism and nationalism, and the principal-agent metaphor of state-federal
relations.
A.

Lessons in Ambition and Humility

Before I do that, though, I also want to recognize another important part of
Heather’s contribution to the discourse, to the profession in general, and
certainly to me personally—which is the great generosity of her mentoring.
Her support and encouragement of other scholars to think creatively and
ambitiously against the grain has pushed the discourse forward as much as
anything else, and I am especially grateful for that. And with that in mind, I
thought I’d contextualize my remarks with a Heather Gerken mentoring
anecdote that helps set up my more substantive comments about the
relationship between environmental and constitutional law within the overall
federalism discourse. The story bridges two separate vignettes in which
Heather alternatively inspired me to be ambitious and reminded me to be
humble (both lessons that I doubtlessly needed, and each in good time!).
My lesson in humility took place at an earlier federalism symposium that,
like this one, honored Heather’s work. At the cocktails afterward, she shared
an early version of the ideas that have come to fruition in her lecture today,
because they harmonized with the insights of my own work. And indeed, I was
very supportive of them—but perhaps insufficiently surprised. I recall
thinking: yes, I agree that the zero-sum boxing match6 between the proponents
of local and national power is a tired and ineffective way of understanding
federalism (and I’ll say more about that later in my remarks). And yes, I
thought; to push the discourse forward, we should focus on the ends of
federalism rather than its means, where the ends represent the purposes of
federalism, or the work that we want federalism to do for us in governance
(and I’ll say more about that later, too).
And yes—this feels very much like what I’ve been arguing for some time,7
along with others from the dynamic federalism school that was already well-

6. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 997 (“I came to the debate late in the game, when it had
reached that point that Robert McCloskey so vividly described in constitutional law—when
everyone seems like aging boxing club members who have fought so long that they know each
other’s moves and fight mostly to tire the other out.”); see also ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE
MODERN SUPREME COURT 291 (1972).
7. See RYAN, supra note 2 (analyzing federalism controversy as a “tug of war” between
competing federalism principles, describing an “interjurisdictional gray area” in which statefederal integration is both inevitable and appropriate, recognizing the unique contributions of
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developed in environmental law8 . . . so why is it suddenly news? And it was in
that moment, as she looked at me puzzled but patiently, that I suddenly
understood that precious few in the pure constitutional law discourse (other
than Heather Gerken!) had paid much attention to anything we had been
saying. Thinking we had changed the field, perhaps we had just been echochambering within our own silo.

different branch actors in managing federalism, and proposing a theory of Balanced Federalism
incorporating these insights).
8. See ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEGAL
STRUCTURE AND THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 9–10 (2d ed.
2009) (discussing the cooperative federalism inherent in Congress’s passage of the Clean Water
Act); THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
(Kalyani Robbins ed., forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author) (collecting the
work of leading environmental federalism scholars on governance strategies and dilemmas
throughout the field); David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1798 (2008)
(rejecting “the traditional static optimization model” of federalism in favor of an adaptive one);
William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and
Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 148 n.4 (2007) (discussing the prevalence of
cooperative federalism schemes in environmental federalism); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative
Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2009) (arguing that iterative
exchange between state and federal actors within environmental federalism programs encourages
regulatory innovation); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 161 (2006) (arguing that jurisdictional overlap in
environmental federalism is preferable to static allocations of authority to either state or federal
actors); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 571
(1996) (arguing for a “multitier regulatory structure that tracks the complexity and diversity of
environmental problems”); Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action
Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global
Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 579–80 (2008) (developing “a framework for
analyzing environmental ceiling preemption” and applying it to the regulation of greenhouse
gases); Blake Hudson, Dynamic Forest Federalism, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1643, 1650 (2014)
(providing an analysis of dual federalism control over subnational forests and arguing for a
“greater dynamism” in U.S. forest policy); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem
Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 190 (2002) (discussing
the emergence of collaborative ecosystem governance); Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism
Proposal for Climate Legislation: The Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENVER
U. L. REV. 791 (2008) (arguing for a cooperative federalism approach for climate change
regulation); Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory
State, 92 IA. L. REV. 545 (2007) (arguing for the integration of state common law with existing
federal and state statutes to facilitate coherence within environmental law); Hari M. Osofsky,
Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA.
L. REV. 237 (2011) (introducing a “diagonal federalism” framework for understanding multilevel
climate governance); Hannah Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky, Dynamic Energy Federalism,
72 MD. L. REV. 773, 778 (2013) (discussing the federalism-related challenges for energy
governance).
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Months later, after sharing a paper with Heather’s Federalism Seminar, we
found ourselves again discussing the marginalization of environmental
perspectives within the overall constitutional discourse. At that point, I
wondered aloud if I should just stop writing in federalism altogether, and start
talking to environmental scholars more likely to be interested in what I had to
say. But in fully animated Gerken form, Heather insisted that I take the fight to
constitutional law instead. She urged me to take on as my next article: “What
Con Law Can Learn from Environmental Law,” modeled after her early efforts
to school “con law” from the perspective of election law.9 And since it is wise
to do what Heather Gerken advises, I thought I’d take the opportunity here to
share a few preliminary thoughts about what constitutional law can indeed
learn from environmental law—at least when it comes to federalism.
II. “WHAT CAN CON LAW LEARN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW”
In preparing these remarks, I thought long and hard about what con law
can learn from environmental law in general, and I actually came up with a
pretty long list. Up at the top: more comfortable clothing! Especially footwear
(and especially for women). Teamwork, too—since environmental law is
interdisciplinary by nature, forcing its experts to consult other sources of
understanding to solve “super wicked” regulatory problems.10 Etiquette may be
a contender (at least if one compares the contrasting tones of the environmental
and constitutional law professor list serves). But in all seriousness, if I were to
choose one thing that constitutional law could truly learn from environmental
law to make the federalism discourse more meaningful, there is a clear and
simple choice—facts. Simple facts: simple, complicated, rich, contextualizing
facts.
A.

Federalism As Applied

Facts: substantive knowledge about a specific field of law and governance.
How statutes actually work, and the way specific regulations actually fill in the
gaps left over after statutes are enacted. And who it is that actually does
everything to fit these pieces together and make them function in the real world
of regulatory governance. What con law can learn from environmental law—
and alternatively, health law and immigration law, and election law and so

9. Heather K. Gerken, Keynote Address: What Election Law Has to Say to Constitutional
Law, 44 IND. L. REV. 7 (2010).
10. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1157–59 (2009) (describing climate
change as an exemplar “super wicked” regulatory problem and discussing the asymmetric design
features necessary for functional climate change governance).
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on—are the actual mechanics of federalism-sensitive governance.11 It’s from
these realms that we understand what federalism really looks and feels like at
the ground level. This is where we meet real American federalism—when we
get out of the abstract plane of pure theory that Heather’s “aging boxing club
members” have been operating in,12 and into the hurly burly of sweaty,
sleeves-rolled-up efforts to manage interjurisdictional conflict and overlap.
Had constitutional law done this before environmental law (and now other
disciplines) had forced it to, it would have noticed long ago that its
predominant model of state-federal relations—at least among aging boxers—is
bankrupt. I’ve previously identified this failed metaphor as the mythology of
“zero-sum federalism,” a traditional view of the relationship between state and
federal power that sees the two sides as locked in a bitter and antagonistic
struggle over the line between them, where every victory for one side
represents a loss for the other.13 (And in the traditional zero-sum model, it’s
just these two sides; the relationship doesn’t go, as Heather has provocatively
described, “all the way down!”14)
But those engaged with the facts know that this is not what American
federalism looks like at all.15 Federalism does, in fact, go “all the way down,”
involving parallel, embedded, and diagonal relationships among local,
regional, and even international actors.16 And that line between state and
federal power, if there is one, is more of an interface—a site of negotiation and
interchange between local and national actors over how to allocate contested
authority in contexts of legitimate jurisdictional overlap.17
Indeed, the growing gap between the zero-sum model and the messy
reality of interjurisdictional governance reveals just how far the aging boxers’
discourse has drifted from a meaningful relationship with the regulatory world
we are all presumably trying to improve. In my own work on negotiated
federalism, I’ve tried to help close the gap by exploring the complex dynamics
11. See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 24–73 (2011)
[hereinafter Ryan, Negotiating Federalism]; RYAN, supra note 2, at 271–314 (both describing the
mechanics of negotiated federalism in a variety of regulatory fields, including environmental
law).
12. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 997–99.
13. RYAN, supra note 2, at 267–68; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 4–5;
Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism Past the Zero Sum Game, 38 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 4, 4
(2012).
14. Heather Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2010).
15. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 315–38; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 74–
102 (both reporting on the perspectives of practitioners of federalism-sensitive governance).
16. Osofsky, supra note 8, at 242–43; Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local
Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs),
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 711–12 (2008).
17. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 265–367; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at
24–73 (both describing the full enterprise of negotiated federalism).
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of intergovernmental relations that more fully approximate the depth and
complexity of American federalism.18 I’ve identified an array of means by
which state and federal actors compete and collaborate through different forms
of intergovernmental bargaining that belie the bright line of separation and the
zero-sum game.19 But to understand these regulatory dynamics, one has to
keep abreast of the way regulatory systems actually work. At some point, it
seems, a few too many armchair federalism theorists forgot the importance of
doing that.
Federalism is an as-applied science. It’s not enough to think in terms of
pure theory; governance theory is tested and made meaningful only through its
application in real contexts. Federalism theorists threaten our own relevance if
we become too divorced from the mechanics of how federalism operates in
specific contexts of governance. And so it is no accident that I came to my
federalism work from a perspective grounded in the particulars of
environmental law, and that Heather Gerken came to hers from election law,
and Abbe Gluck from health law, and so on.20 We came to our various insights

18. For a model of Balanced Federalism in which the allocation of contested constitutional
authority is mediated through various forms of balancing, compromise, and negotiation among all
branches and levels of government, see RYAN, supra note 2, and the previous scholarship it draws
from: Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11 (analyzing how state and federal actors
negotiate to resolve jurisdictional uncertainty and arguing that some of this bargaining may
qualify as legitimate constitutional interpretation); Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral:
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amendment Infrastructure, 81
U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral] (analyzing the
negotiation of structural entitlements in assessing the Supreme Court’s invalidation of
intergovernmental bargaining); Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking
Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 507–08 (2007)
[hereinafter Ryan, Interjurisdictional Gray Area] (exploring inevitable jurisdictional overlap and
uncertainty between clearer realms of state and federal authority). See also Erin Ryan, The
Spending Power and Environmental Law after Sebelius, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1003, 1008 (2014)
(analyzing the impacts of the Supreme Court’s new spending power constraint on state-federal
bargaining in programs of cooperative federalism); Erin Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug
of War Within, in THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS (Kalyani Robbins ed., forthcoming 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Ryan,
Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within] (analyzing how environmental law showcases
the wider conflicts in federalism theory and the structures of governance it has evolved to manage
them); Erin Ryan, The Once and Future Challenges of American Federalism, in 1 THE WAYS OF
FEDERALISM IN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE HORIZONS OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY IN
SPAIN 267, 268–69 (Alberto López Basaguren & Leire Escajedo San-Epifanio eds., Springer
2013) (analyzing developments in state-federal intergovernmental bargaining).
19. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 265–367; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at
24–73 (both articulating a taxonomy of ten different ways that state and federal actors negotiate
with one another, including conventional forms of bargaining, negotiations to reallocate authority,
and joint policymaking bargaining).
20. Gerken, supra note 9, at 17; Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory
Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1154

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1147

about interjurisdictional governance based on our rich experiences with the
way it operates in holistic regulatory fields. In fixating on the zero-sum game,
the aging boxers’ debate lost touch with the ever-evolving textures of
federalism-sensitive governance in specific points of application. Federalism
theory needs content to be meaningful. The days of armchair federalism theory
are over because armchair federalism theory is sterile.
B.

The Canary in Federalism’s Coal Mine

Notably, when I started writing about federalism, I didn’t know that I was
writing in “environmental federalism;” I thought it was just “federalism.” But I
was propelled here by some provocative environmental federalism dilemmas,
and it’s worth considering why environmental law so regularly provides them.
As Heather recognizes, environmental law has been at the forefront of both
federalism controversy and innovation, although other fields of law—marriage,
marijuana, immigration, and health law, among others—are close on its
heels.21 Still, many of the Supreme Court’s most famously divisive federalism
cases are actually environmental cases.22 The New York v. United States23 anticommandeering doctrine decision that commenced the Rehnquist Court’s New
Federalism revival was actually an environmental case about interstate
radioactive waste management.24 The same is true of many of the Court’s
standing cases.25 So in trying to ascertain what con law can learn from
environmental law, it may help to ask why environmental law is so often the
canary-in-the-coal-mine of wider constitutional controversy?26

L.J., 534, 539 (2011); Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 18,
manuscript at 13.
21. Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 18, manuscript at 1 &
nn.1–11 (listing current federalism controversies in different areas of law).
22. Id. manuscript at 16–20 (discussing Supreme Court environmental cases that intersect
with federalism, including Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715 (2006), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)).
23. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
24. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 215–64; Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral, supra note 18,
25–64 (both discussing New York v. United States).
25. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (in a case about National Forest
management, holding that standing under the Administrative Procedure Act is available only for
individualized injuries); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (in a case about
mining on public lands, holding that a plaintiff must show an individualized injury within the
specific “zone of interests” protected by the relevant environmental laws); Friends of the Earth,
Inc., v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (allowing standing to sue a polluter even after
the initial suit was mooted by the voluntary cessation of the polluting activity, unless the
defendant proves that the allegedly wrong behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.).
26. See Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 18, manuscript at
4 (noting that environmental federalism decisions often prove to be the “canary in federalism’s
coal mine”).
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After pondering this question for so many years, it seems to me that the
reason environmental law has been both a wellspring for creative
interjurisdictional governance and a hotbed of federalism controversy is
because it engages problems in which opposing claims to preeminently local or
preemptively national authority are both, simultaneously, at their strongest.27
For example, environmental problems often involve some kind of a land use,
and we all know that the regulation of land use is one of the most classically
local forms of governing authority.28 There are good reasons for that.29 But
environmental problems also involve boundary crossing, spillover harms that
are the classic basis for centralized regulatory authority, to protect those at risk
for harm who are outside the local jurisdiction and unrepresented in relevant
governance decisions.30 In this respect, these opposing claims for exclusively
local or national supremacy in environmental federalism dilemmas break down
because everybody is so right. (And as a corollary, when everybody is so right,
the other side seems especially wrong—accounting for the extreme
controversy that attends environmental federalism dilemmas.) But when
everyone is equally right and wrong, what does federalism tell us to do?31
III. POINTS OF CONVERGENCE: OF MEANS AND ENDS
This brings me to my most important point of agreement with Heather’s
détente proposal, which is her rightful admonition that we shift our focus from
the means of federalism (how things should work) to the ends of federalism
(what we are working for)32—because it is federalism’s ends that will
ultimately tell us how things should work in these circumstances. Indeed, this
is the very point that I have been trying to make, though less eloquently and
successfully than Heather, since my very first federalism law review article,
which became the basis for my later book, Federalism and the Tug of War
Within.33 In a nutshell, my argument has been that the only way to figure out
how to allocate contested authority in a federal system is to figure out what

27. Id. manuscript at 11–20.
28. See Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 80 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
(identifying zoning among “the most essential functions” of local government); RYAN, supra note
2, at xii (noting that states administer local zoning laws).
29. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 50–59 (discussing the benefits of local autonomy in
governance).
30. See id. at 145–80; Ryan, Interjurisdictional Gray Area, supra note 18, at 567–70 (both
discussing interjurisdictional regulatory problems).
31. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 1030 (noting that no one among the opposing interpretive
camps has a monopoly on truth).
32. Id. at 998.
33. RYAN, supra note 2, at xi–xii (drawing on Ryan, Interjurisdictional Gray Area, supra
note 18).
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will best advance the underlying values of federalism.34 These underlying good
governance values tell us what federalism is for. Protecting and enhancing
these values in governance is the purpose of federalism—the work we ask
federalism to do for us in channeling actual government toward our
governance ideals.35 They are, in other words, the ends of federalism.
A.

The Ends of Federalism

In Federalism and the Tug of War Within, I draw from the federalism
literature and jurisprudence to extrapolate a set of four or five core values,
some familiar and some less so.36 There is the value of checks and balances
between local and national authority, which protects individuals against
government overreaching or abdication by either level.37 Ideally, federalism
helps foster accountability and transparency in governance, enhancing
democratic participation at all points along the jurisdictional spectrum.38
Federalism fosters diversity, innovation, and interjurisdictional competition by
protecting local autonomy39 while affirming central authority to resolve
collective action problems, police spillover harms, and vindicate core
constitutional promises of individual rights.40 And last but not least, though
perhaps least recognized, is the problem-solving synergy that federalism
enables us to harness between the distinctive capacities of different
governmental actors—the kind of governance that can only happen, or that
happens best, at the local, regional, state, or federal level, and among the
various branches of government—for getting at the different parts of complex,
interjurisdictional problems that can’t be resolved at any one level or by any
one actor alone.41 Environmental law has lots of problems like this, which has
surely shepherded my thinking along these lines.42
So these values are the ends of federalism—the purposes to which
federalism should aspire, and the touchstone for constitutional interpreters

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 34–67 (identifying four values, in which the value of central authority is partnered
with problem-solving synergy); Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra
note 18, manuscript at 6–9 (adding more explicit consideration of the value of centralized
oversight as a fifth, independent value).
37. RYAN, supra note 2, at 39–44.
38. Id. at 44–50.
39. Id. at 50–59.
40. Id. at 59–66; See Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 18,
manuscript at 6–7 (discussing the value of centralized oversight).
41. RYAN, supra note 2, at 59–66.
42. See Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 18, manuscript at
11–20 (discussing the unique collision of federalism values in environmental law and the
resulting interjurisdictional challenges for environmental governance).
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when making federalism-sensitive governance decisions. The problem for
federalism-sensitive governance, of course, is that while these are all
individually wonderful values in and of themselves, it can be very hard to
always satisfy all of them, all together, at the same time. 43 There are inherent,
inevitable tensions among them, which the jurisprudence has not always
recognized. Some are quite obvious—for example, the open tension between
localism and nationalism values that, in large part, animates the aging boxers’
debate that Heather is trying here to disband.44 But the network of federalism
values are suffused with other, less obvious tensions as well—for example,
between checks and accountability. After all, if we only cared about
accountability, we’d do better with a single sovereign controlling a fully
centralized system (rather than our confusing system of dual state and federal
sovereignty), because it’s easy to know who is responsible for bad policy if
there is only one policymaker! But we reject that model because it would
entirely foreclose the checks and balances (and interjurisdictional synergy) for
which we are willing to make tradeoffs against accountability values.45
B.

The Tug of War Within

The problem for federalism-sensitive governance is that figuring out how
to work through all this tension can be really, really hard. Protecting one value
imposes costs on another, but adjusting for that creates problems for still
another. That’s why federalism dilemmas generate so much controversy—
there are multiple, sometimes equally compelling considerations, all operating
at once.46 That’s why the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence has
vacillated so much over time—as the Court alternatively picks out one value to
privilege and then shifts to another that the previous approach has left
vulnerable.47 And for what it’s worth, this is why federalism theory is so
important. At the end of the day, it’s all we’ve got to help us conceptualize our
way through this particularly complex constitutional maze—which is about so
much more than just states’ rights versus nationalism.48

43. Id. at 6–9; See RYAN, supra note 2, at 34–67 (discussing the fundamental federalism
values and the inevitable tensions between them).
44. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 999–1001.
45. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 47–48 (discussing the conflict between the accountability
value and other core federalism values).
46. See id. at 66–67 (discussing the conflicting federalism values of checks and balances,
accountability and participation, local innovation and competition, and state-federal problemsolving synergy).
47. See id. at 68–104 (discussing the historical pendulum swing amongst the competing
values).
48. See id. at 368–72 (discussing the values competition within good federalism-sensitive
governance and the need for federalism theory that is more sensitive to these dynamics).
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For this reason, I have encouraged us to think about federalism less as a
matter of the contest between states’ rights and federal power, or that between
judicial or political safeguards, or even dueling conceptions of original
intent—and to think about it more as our ongoing response to the inevitable
conflicts that play out among federalism’s core principles.49 As noted, my own
federalism scholarship identifies that response as one heavily mediated by
mechanisms of governance that enable structured forms of consultation,
competition, compromise, and other forms of joint decision-making across
jurisdictional lines. These examples of “negotiated federalism”—some
obvious, some less so—engage perspectives from up and down the
jurisdictional spectrum and across the different branches of government,
ideally to enable federalism-sensitive governance to benefit from the unique
competency that each brings to the decision-making table.50
C. Balanced Federalism
If I had more time, I would sketch out how my own theory of Balanced
Federalism facilitates this dynamic allocation of responsibility, capitalizing on
the different kinds of substantive expertise, legal authority, governing
competency, and other forms of regulatory capacity that attach to executive,
legislative, and judicial actors at the local, state, and federal levels.51 The
Balanced Federalism model splits some of the differences that provoke conflict
in the traditional federalism debate. It is not pre-committed to preferring
regulatory authority at either the state or the federal level, nor is it fully
committed to either judicial or political safeguards.52 In arbitrating between
these camps, the Balanced Federalism approach takes as its touchstone the
good governance values at the heart of federalism.53 The right direction is the
one that keeps us most faithful to our ability to delivery holistically on these
values. Everything else in the administration of federalism is just the means to
these ends.
The details of Balanced Federalism are supportive of Heather’s vision
here—I emphasize the value of procedural consensus in the absence of
substantive consensus, relying on bilaterally negotiated political safeguards
subject to limited judicial review for bargaining abuses—but they are well

49. Id. at xi.
50. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 265–367; see, e.g., Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note
11 (both discussing various types of intergovernmental bargaining and the different ways they
capitalize on expertise within different levels and branches of governance).
51. See RYAN, supra note 2, at xxvi–xxix, 181–83, 368–72 (discussing the theoretical and
practical implications of Balanced Federalism).
52. Id. at xxvi–xxvii.
53. Id. at 368–72.
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developed in my book,54 so I’ll spend the rest of my time sharing the points on
which she and I disagree.
IV. POINTS OF DIVERGENCE: FALSE DICHOTOMIES
As is probably clear by now, there is a lot of harmony between our
approaches. In fact, the biggest difference between the vision Heather
articulates here and the approach I’ve taken in my own scholarship is that I
may take it even further than she does—as evidenced by the three points that I
raise for critique. To be fair, some of these are more quibbles than conflicts,
and some may come down to semantics—but the vocabulary we use to talk
about these things is important. So with that in mind, I offer these three
suggestions for the ideas going forward.
A.

Process and Principle

As an initial matter, the draft on which my comments were originally
premised had asserted that this new conception of state-federal relations is
premised on “practice, not presumptions” and “processes, not principle”55—
and there is clear truth in the statement. As poetic as it is, however, it may have
been a little too glib—eliding the complex relationship between process and
principle in federalism theory. To her credit, Heather later modified the
relevant phrase to “practice as well as presumptions; processes as well as
principles.”56 Yet because others make a similar point, I preserve my original
observation that the “process, not principle” view of federalism threatens to
miss a critical part of the fuller story we are all telling.
The new wave of scholarship supporting détente is, indeed, cognizant of
the importance of process in American federalism, especially process that
facilitates the integration of local and national perspective in federalismsensitive governance.57 My scholarly interest in intergovernmental bargaining
as a source of procedural safeguards places my own work squarely in the camp
of process-oriented federalism theory.58 But as much as I believe that
American federalism is largely about fluidity and exchange and process, I also
54. Id. at 339–67 (discussing the interpretative potential of qualifying intergovernmental
bargaining).
55. Heather Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente? 3 (Oct. 5, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
56. Gerken, supra note 1, at 999 (“It is premised on practice as well as presumptions;
processes as well as principles; routines as well as regulations.”).
57. See Gerken, supra note 4, at 1893, 1895 (discussing the importance of the interaction
between the state and federal governments); see also Ryan, Navigating the Separation of Powers,
supra note 4, at 22–23 (describing new federalism scholarship better probing the relationship
between process and principle).
58. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 339–67 (discussing the use of governance processes as
interpretive criteria).
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think that it’s more than just an empty vessel.59 The purpose of all this process
is to advance the ends of federalism, which I view as the principles of good
governance that federalism is designed to yield—the federalism values I’ve
been describing here.
And so—as Heather’s final draft affirms—I don’t think we can divorce
process from principles, even in the context of process-sensitive federalism
theory. These are probably a different set of principles than the ones the aging
boxers have been battling over (which may explain the passing assertion in the
original draft). But in my view, we can only evaluate whether the process is
successful by the degree to which it helps us accomplish these principles in
governance. In the end, the job of federalism theory is to help us ensure that
the governance processes we employ accomplish the principles we are aiming
for in that governance.
It may be that when this issue arises, the real sticking point is simply the
presentation of the process-principle question as an either/or dichotomy—
when in fact, the most interesting thing about process and principle in
federalism is the under-appreciated association between them. As I’ve shown
in previous work, many of the federalism principles that matter most to us—
checks and balances, accountability and transparency, synergy, and so on—are,
themselves, procedural values.60 For example, we often think of checks and
balances as yielding a substantive value—the protection of individuals at the
mercy of regulatory whim—but checks and balances inherently imply the
process of counterbalancing political power by which that protection is
conferred.61
The same is true for the accountability value, which is essentially a
procedural constraint for ensuring democratic participation—which is, itself, a
process.62 Even local autonomy is a process value: it describes how decisionmaking should take place (at the local level), rather than what the content of
those decisions should be.63 And we like local autonomy, because we hope it
will foster the additional process-principles of innovation and competition. We
may casually think of these federalism values as substantive principles, but in
fact, they can only be actualized procedurally. It is in this sense that observers
are sometimes right to assert that federalism is more about process than
principle. My friendly amendment is to point out that an even better way of
looking at this is to understand that they are often one and the same thing.

59. See Ryan, Navigating the Separation of Powers, supra note 4, at 22–23 (arguing that
principle, not just process, is essential to federalism).
60. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 347–49; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at
110–13 (both discussing the procedural constraints implied by federalism values).
61. RYAN, supra note 2, at 347; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 111.
62. RYAN, supra note 2, at xxx.
63. Id.
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Indeed, the federalism discourse has overemphasized “political”
safeguards at the expense of the more important feature distinguishing them, at
least in the federalism context, which is the fact that they are really functioning
as “procedural” safeguards.64 To this end, in Federalism and the Tug of War
Within, and a precursor article, Negotiating Federalism, which Heather kindly
credits for jumpstarting some of this discussion,65 I propose additional
theoretical support for political federalism constraints on grounds that political
branch bargaining can sometimes better advance the underlying principles of
federalism by engaging the parties of interest in processes of consultation and
compromise that advance these process-oriented values better than unilateral
judicial or statutory decree.66 My proposal limits judicial review over the
substance of negotiated federalism decisions, but it allows for judicial review
to police for the kinds of procedural abuses that violates these principles—
appropriately focusing constitutional intervention at the points that most reflect
these procedural constitutional values.67
B.

Federalism and Nationalism

My second point of critique targets the seemingly mutually exclusive
vocabulary of “federalism” vs. “nationalism” around which the Détente piece
is centered.68 I certainly understand its progeny in Heather’s earlier work,69 but
the dichotomy doesn’t resonate with me by the end of the piece. It
inadvertently reinforces the zero-sum idea that the important divide within
federalism theory is between advocates for states’ right and advocates for
national power. While I understand that this is where the aging boxers’ debate
begins, it’s important to end a piece calling for détente within the federalism
debate with greater recognition that “federalism” is not—and never has been—
synonymous with states’ rights.70 And for that same reason, “federalism” in not

64. See id. at 347–56; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 110–21 (both
describing how federalism values can operate as procedural constraints in certain contexts).
65. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1004 n.22; Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note
14, at 20 n.50, 21 n.58.
66. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 339–67; see also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note
11, at 102–35.
67. RYAN, supra note 2, at xxx.
68. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1000–01 (distinguishing the “federalism” and “nationalism”
camps).
69. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256, 1258–59 (2009); Gerken, supra note 4, at 1917.
70. See RYAN, supra note 2, at xi (arguing that federalism is not best understood as a battle
between federal power and states’ rights but rather as a balance between competing underlying
values).
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in opposition to “nationalism.” Using this dualistic opposition perpetuates the
ideological fallacy that the dynamic federalism perspective has exploded.71
Of course, Heather is legitimately using this vocabulary, because it preexists the conversation we are having today. Though wrongheaded, it is
already entrenched within the discourse, and so it may be useful to bridge the
new scholarly conversation to the old. Especially at the beginning of the piece,
she uses this terminology in the spirit of building common ground, in order to
lead us away from the tired old boxing match between ideological opponents.
But as the piece progresses, I’d encourage her to help push the discourse
forward by reconceptualizing the relationship between local and national
power within the federal system in more accurate terms. A better way of
talking about it, after acknowledging the terminology of the old boxing match
that she is trying to end, is to rely more heavily on the terminology of
devolution and centralization that she uses elsewhere in the piece.72
The dynamics of devolution and centralization seem to better capture what
she means by federalism and nationalism. Each term emphasizes a location of
primary decision-making authority within a federal system of dual sovereignty,
rather than misaligning them with larger and sentimentally charged
conceptions of the federal system or nationhood itself. A federal system
anticipates both state and federal power, both local and national decisionmaking.73 The United States is a federal nation. Proponents of “federalism,” by
definition, favor centralized decision-making in many contexts; otherwise they
would be proponents of a confederal system, such as the failed Articles of
Confederation, or secessionists.74 Indeed, federalism versus nationalism, while
an accepted one, is a false dichotomy. Federalism isn’t about states’ rights or
nationalism—it’s about good governance. Once again, it’s about the ends, the
principles, the values of federalism that we’ve been talking about. And since
Heather’s piece is so effective at drawing the discourse toward this new
understanding, it would be worth further shifting away from the old, zero-sum
vocabulary by the end of the piece, if not earlier.
C. Principals and Agents
My last point of critique also touches on semantics, but extends into deeper
theoretical territory. For related reasons, the principal-agent vocabulary of the
piece doesn’t work for me,75 and I encourage Heather to reconsider how she
deploys it in this piece. Of course, her use of the principal-agent metaphor

71. Id. at xxvi–xxvii.
72. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 1001–07 (discussing devolution and decentralization).
73. RYAN, supra note 2, at 7–11.
74. Id. at 58–59.
75. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 1010 (discussing state power as the “power of the servant”
and describing it as stemming from “a principal-agent relationship”).
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makes perfect sense in light of her previous work, including Uncooperative
Federalism76 and other landmark forays into the intricacies of local-statefederal relations. But there are considerable problems with its role in this
particular piece, ranging from the strategic to the substantive.
As an initial matter, her reliance on principal-agent language here creates
problems at the level of the communication strategy. Casting the states as
agents of a national principal may not be the best selling point in an article
trying to persuade the proponents of states’ rights to lay down their arms. It has
the potential to make her call for détente seem more like a Trojan Horse, at
least from the perspective of the aging boxers on that side of the fight! To be
fair, the metaphor holds some important truth, reflecting the role of many
states operating in programs of cooperative federalism within the constitutional
ether of federal supremacy.77 But it may undermine Heather’s credibility as the
ambassador of a reasonable middle ground approach, because it seems to
reinforce the old power dynamics that other parts of her argument are
seemingly dismantling.
Moreover, while the metaphor accurately portrays some of the dynamics
within cooperative federalism, it misses other elements of the relationship that
are hugely important in the overall context of state-federal relations. For
example, it elides one of the most important characteristics of American
federalism more generally, which is the feature of “regulatory backstop”
between local and national authority over history.78 Regulatory backstop refers
to the way that sovereign authority on both levels is used to “backstop” one
another’s failures in protecting individual rights or advancing overall societal
welfare.79 Most famously in the civil rights context, the federal government
backstopped failures by the states to protect the rights of women and minorities
during the 1960s. Today, state actors are backstopping regulatory failures by
the federal government to protect the rights of the LGBT community.80
Regulatory backstop has proved a crucial feature of environmental
federalism as well. The federal government backstopped state failures to
protect air and water quality during the 1970s, and today, state and local
governments are backstopping federal failures to meaningfully grapple with
climate policy.81 Similar examples have arisen in countless other contexts,

76. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 69, at 1262–63, 1265.
77. See Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 20–37 (describing the mechanics of
environmental programs of cooperative federalism).
78. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 42–43 (discussing the regulatory backstop features associated
with checks and balances).
79. Id.
80. Id. at xxviii–xxix; see id. at 89–91 (discussing evolutions in federalism theory at the time
of the Civil Rights Movement).
81. Id. at xxvii–xxviii; see id. at 167–76 (discussing regulatory backstop in the context of
climate governance).
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ranging from eminent domain reform to marijuana policy to species
protection.82 In these situations, the states are emphatically not acting as agents
of the federal principal; they are acting in direct competition. So there is a big
theoretical problem in the principal-agent account of state-federal relations. It
misses too much of the reality in the relationship to be useful, at least as it
stands in the piece today.
V. CONCLUDING PROPOSAL: THE INVERTED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP
All that said, I’d like to close by proposing a way that the principal-agent
vocabulary might still work—if we expand the lens. Specifically, we should
consider how much more powerful the metaphor becomes if we include all
applicable variations on the theme. To get closer to the reality of the statefederal relationship, we should account not only for the principal-agent
relationships that Heather has already identified—in which the states acts as
agents of the federal principal—but also those instances in which the federal
government operates as an agent of the state principal.
Examples of this inverted principal-agent relationship may be fewer in
number given the role of federal supremacy, but even within some programs of
cooperative federalism, federal supremacy has been purposefully waived to
approximate an inverted principal-agent relationship between state and federal
actors.83 In environmental law, for example, both the Coastal Zone
Management Act and the Clean Water Act create circumstances in which the
federal government must win state approval of federal plans in an area of law
clearly governed by federal commerce authority.84 Countless other statutes also
carve out space for state leadership on issues that could have been subject to
federal preemption, including those Abbe Gluck explained earlier today.85
In other cases, federal agency to the state principle is a function of clear
doctrinal principle. For example, under the Erie doctrine of federal civil
procedure, federal courts apply state laws to resolve state-law based disputes

82. Id. at xxviii, 313 (eminent domain reform), 311–12 (marijuana policy), 292–94 (species
protection).
83. See Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, supra note 18, manuscript at
29–31 (discussing structural privileging of state choices in the context of water allocation, the
Coastal Zone Management Act, and Clean Water Act). See also RYAN, supra note 2, at 295–96
(discussing inverted federal supremacy in hydroelectric and offshore drilling licensing); id. at
302–08 (discussing the Coastal Zone Management Act’s limited waiver of federal supremacy).
See also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 48–50 (discussing federal licensing
decisions); id. at 59–62 (discussing the Coastal Zone Management Act).
84. Id.
85. Abbe Gluck, Nationalism as the New Federalism (and Federalism as the New
Nationalism): A Complementary Account (and Some Challenges) to the Nationalist School, 59
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1045 (2015).
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that are in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.86 The federal government
may also act as an agent of state law when collaborating in criminal law
enforcement, disaster relief, and the ratification and enforcement of interstate
compacts.87 Many areas of federal law implicitly rely on state law to be
intelligible—for example, federal tax and bankruptcy laws that rely on state
law definitions of property and family relations.88 The implementation and
administration of those laws puts federal actors in the position of faithfully
carrying out policy decisions made by separately acting state actors, wielding
power only as the servant of the state master.
Finally, if we move beyond the doctrinal sphere to the political, we see the
federal government acting as an agent of state interests all the time. This
happens whenever the states use available channels within the political process
to persuade Congress to pass federal laws that are tailored to state interests,
such as federal block grants, stimulus packages, and financial services
legislation.89 It happens whenever they persuade federal agencies to implement
statutes in ways that address state concerns, as took place during different
iterations of the REAL ID Act.90 It happens within programs of cooperative
federalism that are redesigned to allow states to compete directly with federal
standards, such as the Clean Air Act’s mechanism for setting motor vehicle
emissions.91 It happens whenever state and federal agents work together in the
contexts where both sides have overlapping regulatory interests and
obligations, in all sorts of less formal ways that nevertheless make up the
fabric of the “hurly burly” of federalism-sensitive governance.

86. Erie R.R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
87. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 17–33 (discussing disaster relief and the federal response to
Hurricane Katrina); id. at 215–25 (discussing state-led legislative bargaining over the Low Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act in detail); id. at 286–87 (discussing criminal law enforcement); id.
at 290–92 (discussing the federal ratification of interstate water and radioactive waste compacts).
See also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 31–33 (adding more detail on statefederal relations in criminal law enforcement).
88. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 111 (discussing definitional overlap between federal
bankruptcy and state property law).
89. Id. at 283–84 (discussing federal stimulus and financial services reform legislation); id.
at 289 (discussing energy independence block grants). See also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism,
supra note 11, at 29–31 (adding more detail on stimulus and financial services); id. at 39 (energy
independence block grants).
90. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 301–02; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 56–
58 (both discussing the REAL ID Act).
91. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 308–10; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 11, at 65–
69 (both discussing the Clean Air Act’s iterative federalism mechanism for setting motor vehicle
emissions).
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Much of the scholarly work that Heather engages looks at exactly the way
federal lawmaking becomes a tool or agent of state priorities.92 Indeed, one
political scientist recently offered a compelling account of how surprisingly
successful states are at wielding their influence over federal lawmaking within
the political process.93 If Heather expands the principle-agent metaphor to
encompass this additional dimension, I think that would be a compelling
addition to an already compelling body of work.
Either way, the field is better for her work, and we should all be grateful
for her efforts to bring this much-needed détente to the discourse.

92. See ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 151–63 (2009) (proposing a model of “polyphonic federalism” that
emphasizes the beneficial interaction of state and federal law); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism
by Waiver After the Health Care Case, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013) (discussing states’
bargaining advantages upon waiver of a federal spending condition); Jessica Bulman-Pozen,
From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American
Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1922 (2014) (describing state actors’ successful use of their
political connections with federal actors to safeguard state autonomy); William W. Buzbee,
Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons,
57 EMORY L.J. 145, 146 (2007) (discussing how multilayered regulatory federalism empowers
state autonomy within federal programs to incentivize regulatory innovation); Abbe Gluck,
Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in
Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 537 (2011) (arguing that state actors are
increasingly implementing and interpreting federal statutory law); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The
Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual
Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 822–23 (1998) (discussing the discretion of state
governments to implement or refuse federal legislation according to state priorities); Robert A.
Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to
Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1481 (2009) (arguing that states can legalize
behavior criminalized under federal law, and that state lawmakers ultimately hold more power
than their federal counterparts by establishing the norms on which actual law enforcement
depends); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and
Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2099–2100 (2014) (discussing the dialectic of
influence between sub-federal and federal actors upon national issues).
93. JOHN NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS
IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 116–18 (2009).

